Lending to Lemons or Investing in Peaches?
(blogged by David Bailey, John Clancy and Alex de Ruyter)
Henry Paulson on October 14th 2008 believed that he spoke on behalf of the American people that the "Government owning a stake in any private U.S. company is objectionable to most Americans - me included". That was before he proceeded to instruct the Treasury to make $250 billion in capital available to U.S. financial institutions in the form of preferred stock.
In the UK, where the Chancellor and Chief Secretary to the Treasury frequently state that they are not bankers and do not want to be in the banking business, there is an as yet undawned, but imminent realisation that the government is now a bank (whether it likes it or not) and the government officers are bankers. As Larry Elliott has noted (see link here) "... it is still unclear whether the chancellor and his team fully comprehend the fin de siecle nature of what has happened over the past month."
Indeed, we are all bankers now. What is perhaps not realised - except by the likes of Will Hutton - is that this may well be the case for the long term. Once Paulson and Darling both realise that this is a pretty permanent state of affairs with very little chance of going back to a completely hands-off banking system, the best long-term decisions will be made for the economy.
Yes, it could well be the case that in the short term (5-7 years) some of the government's preferred stock may yet be sold on for a profit to the taxpayers. The problem in the short term is relying on the bailout and the recapitalisation of the British Banking system as the way to bring bank liquidity into the system and, in particular, to supply liquidity to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Is this simply trying to renew trust in the system that got us into this mess in the first place? Or put another way, where's "the pro for the quid"?
The real problem is the short-termism endemic within the UK banking and business investment systems. If that goes unreformed, even in the short-term, some of the capitalisation moneys supplied by the issue of gilts and handed over to the banks could simply end up throwing good money after bad.
The government made it clear that the amount now available to the banks (the gilts were issued on 22nd October) would be well in excess of that actually needed to adequately recapitalise under the Internationally agreed banking treaties and agreements. The government may have over-egged the pudding deliberately to over-reassure. The banks were certainly well re-assured, though (child-like) complaining about dividend restrictions (but they would say that anyway).
The 'capitalisation surplus' could have been held back pending clear agreement as to the expected (contractually enforceable) future behaviour of the banks with regard to business and private lending.
Or rather, let's think more radically. Why couldn't the surplus over adequate recapitalisation be held back entirely and remain in the hands of the state banks specifically to micro-invest long-term in SMEs in a way that the unreformed banks show little sign of embarking upon.
The government could then direct investment and liquidity into the SME and other business sectors immediately. Why wait for the shell-shocked re-capitalised new bank executives to go through their internal procedures and processes eventually to emerge with a probably half-hearted plan to provide liquidity to business generally and SMEs in particular?
What is required is not a renewal of 'lending' to business and SMEs, but 'investment' in business and SMEs, and for the very long term. And the model that is required is, indeed, the Paulson model: the owning of a stake by government not just in Banks, but in ordinary, everyday businesses. If it's good enough for the banks, why not for SMEs?
Taking equity, preferred stock, A ordinary shares, small business mortgages, debentures: whatever form it takes is not some new model of socialist iniquity or 'crypto-communism', it's the way non-banking investment businesses have actually been doing it for decades.
It's called long-term venture capitalism. A venture capital company (e.g. 3i Group plc) invests often for 15 years or over in another business (usually an SME) in return for (the now ubiquitous) preferred shares. The aim is for higher returns over the long-term.
The long term partnership between bank and investee sees the investment through shorter business and economic cycles and may not provide immediate short-term return; but long-term, the nature of the investment can become extremely profitable for the Venture Capital company and the investee business as well. It's not able to be called in at a moment's notice like a business overdraft.
A long-term, maturing business investment makes the holding of and eventual disposal/redemption of the shares extremely valuable, outperforming short term investments on both sides.
The preferred shares structure (as with the re-capitalisation model with squealing banks) restricts the pure freedom of the directors and ordinary shareholders in the short-term but for a disciplined reason: to protect the risk of the investment and to ensure that it is a partnership of sorts in which everyone is pulling together. A restriction of 'pure' capitalism, certainly. But a system designed to strengthen it. Note the end of capitalism but rather a different form perhaps, building on some of its best features.
We will get nowhere on either side of the Atlantic if we simply leave the future of business to the short-termism which has characterised the economy over the last 30 years. We need to re-write the rules and start again with regard to the way business works to protect business from itself.
The squealing of the banks over dividend restrictions is an indicator of how much they do not 'get' the new environment springing up around them. The same will apply in business generally. Business may not like the idea of giving away control, indeed giving away shares, in return for solid, long-term investment which will massively benefit the business and the economy for the long term.
The problem is that business generally and sometimes SMEs too often rather like the financing of their businesses by large overdrafts form their bank and short-expensive business loans - it's what they're used to. But as Public Sector reform mantra of the last 15 years has it: if you always do what you've always done, you'll always get what you always got.
There's a common phrase amongst venture capitalists which rings true: Lemons ripen before peaches. Short-term, apparent success can often accompany an absolute Lemon in terms of long-term success. Long-term patient finance can often grow steady, successful mature businesses in a wider economy that is similarly steady, successful and mature as a result. Venture capitalists also identify the 'Dead Cat Bounce': even a dead cat will bounce when dropped from a height, looking like it still has life in it when it's as dead as a doornail. Short-term views can be deceptive.
Recapitalisation must not be part of a dead cat bounce. We should aim for peaches. And that will mean that the government must not rely on the old structures in which we have little confidence. The major banks simply do not have a clue how to go about long term, investing in business for the benefit of all of us. They will simply want to lend. Why would they know anything about it? They haven't been doing it for the last 60 years.
Consequently, the government in the UK and in the US should retain part of the recapitalisation moneys or issue new gilts directly to invest in the market place now in return for equity and/or secured assets for 15 year investments.
These should be directed at the regional and even local government level in state-owned regional investment / development banks. The banks might be even based (even owned) at city or city-region level with re-investment of the profits in that area. These investments are just as, if not more likely, to mature with significant long-term profits for the tax payer. Bonds could be re-issued on the strength of the maturing investment.
Over ten years ago we wrote a piece for the journal Renewal which proposed this model. We called it Venture Socialism. It proposed the setting up of regional development banks to invest long-term for equity stakes in SMEs. Along with the investment we suggested would come obligations by the company in respect of transparency, ethical business practices, environmental protection, community position, employment rights, trades union recognition etc.
Many of the businesses which may go to the wall over the next few years without having had the confidence of long-term investment might have been better able to weather the coming storm if they had received this long-term equity investment.
Standard traditional approaches to the new order will mean that the US or UK government will have decided that they wish to Lend to Lemons rather than Invest in Peaches. Those readers who think this is pie-in-the-sky might like to note that there was substantial government support for venture capital over decades in the US. Maybe we could do something similar here to plug the finance gap.
David Bailey and Alex de Ruyter both work at the Birmingham Business School and John Clancy is a former Birmingham City Councilllor, venture capital solicitor and runs two SMEs including MediaFuturesAlert.com
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OK, all good knock-about stuff, but if 3i is a private company doing all this long-term venture capital investment and is busily restructuring companies as you claim, and it has gone 'up market' in going for bigger deals then isn't there simply a gap in the market that other venture capital firms can fill if they wish? why is there a 'finance gap' as you claim? I don't see how the market is failing here.
Hello Jason,
thanks for your comment. Sorry to say this but I should point that "Investors in Industry" as 3i was first called, was instigated by the Government, despite opposition from the main banks and had "a distinct socialist aroma".
The point is this. Can we use the enormous tax-payer support being put into the financial system to re-engineer it and do something more positive for industrial renewal in the UK? The Germans (and other continentals) have been doing this for years and suddenly their model seems more attractive than the Anglo-Saxon model right now.
Ironically, the German industrial development banks were set up by the Brits in their occupation zone after WWII. A classic case of "think British" in being innovative. Why can't we learn from that now?
'A distinct socialist aroma'? 3i? where did you get that from? whilst I'm not adverse to rethinking the system of capitalism, isn't the point that capitalism does that itself? Who exactly will be in the position of making these long term investments that you advocate? seems like the back door to socialism to me. I take the point about better support for small firms - but the givernment seems to have handed the cash over and then thought about that afterwards and now have no levers to pull. D'Oh.
Hi Marcus,
Well, 3i was established as a private-sector institution, but via government initiative, and with public agencies as shareholders for much of its history. The Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC) was set up in 1945 despite the clearing banks being reluctant shareholders, and from its inception had that "distinct socialist aroma” (Coopey and Clarke, 1995) . The clearing banks were actually compelled to participate “under threat of sterner action”. The ICFC was set up with freedom from interference by its shareholders - including the Treasury and the Bank of England - paving the way for it to carve out its own role, later merging with Finance Corporation for Industry and eventually being floated as what we now know as 3i (Investors In Industry). There is a clear message - and precedent - here, namely that the Scottish government has an enabling role in facilitating change in the financial system, and that the institutions it creates can, if need be, go their own way as private or public-private organisations.
In a similar vein, when tighter (central) government control deprived the local authority created Enterprise Boards of the1980s of local authority funding, the Boards began to act as venture capital agents, using money from pension funds and elsewhere, thereby stimulating the development of private-sector regional venture capital funds. Whilst the level of investment involved was modest, the Boards were successful in identifying a funding gap, and that investment opportunities can be created by pro-active funding bodies armed with new forms of finance, support and strategy.
Refs:
Coopey, R and D Clarke (1995) 3i. Fifty Years of Investing in Industry. Oxford: OUP.
Dear Marcus,
I take your point about the Government handing over cash with no seeming strings attached. All the more reason why we are arguing about "investing in peaches" rather than "lending to lemons".
As for your comment about "who will be in the position of making these long-term decisions"; in line with our original posting, i would suggest a "Regional Development Bank"; the executive board of which would be appointed by a publically-accountable RDA (which would have some kind of democratic accountability). Surely this would be better than the current set-up of senior bankers, who it seems were not even accountable to shareholders - and in all likelihood didn't understand the complexity of what they were doing!
I would claim to be no academic, however the notion of a local bank investing in local matters seems to be a bit of a no brainer to me. Each area of economic activity has a critical size and as I see life a global banking system is, generally, too big. Our global banking monsters cares not a lot about old Mrs Jones modest investment or her neighbours family mortgage, these are but numbers and values to be traded internationally by faceless, greedy institutions set on massive personal wealth reward. From their loins they vomit all manner of means of producing yet more profit and bumper bonus schemes. Unimaginably to the man on the “TWM Double Decker“ organisations, even, which feed off the demise of other business institutions; this can only be pornographic, perverse and plain wrong.
We need localised banking institutions that understand local issues and local business. and have a key interest in what happens to business and localities twenty years on. Lets reinvent the Municipal Banking System, lets bring together the proven enthusiasm of the local authority and local entrepreneurial business leaders, blend that with investments from Mr and Mrs Brummie and we have the premises of a real winner.
I have as much faith in Councillor Mike Whitby as I would with Sir Neville Bosworth as with Sir Richard Knowles or Sir Albert Bore to stand up for Birmingham and with it’s business communities to build and administer localised banking that would serve our immediate communities. Service that is not short term but with built in vision and longevity, the old bankers have failed us let’s look to knew fresh and vibrant models. Lets try out Municipal values, values that gave us, clean water, roads, domestic fuel, education and hospitals. Let them run our money, on our behalf and by God if they upset us we can run them from office and hound their parties for years.
Hi Mike
I couldn't agree more.... your point on the need for "localised banking institutions that understand local issues and local business. and have a key interest in what happens to business and localities twenty years on. Lets reinvent the Municipal Banking System" was visionary - see the Post yesterday on this!!
Cheers
Dave