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All aboard? Bombardier, train making and industrial policy in the UK

By David Bailey on Dec 29, 11 10:52 AM in Manufacturing


The UK's last train-making factory was yesterday thrown a lifeline - for now at least - after winning a contract worth £188 million to assemble 130 new rail carriages for the Southern franchise.

The plant, now owned by the Canadian multinational Bombardier after numerous ownership changes and accompanying underinvestment, has been under threat since the government controversially selected the German firm Siemens as the preferred bidder for a huge (£1.4 billion) Thameslink trains contract earlier this year.

The latter deal prompted Bombardier to announce over 1400 job cuts at Derby, roughly half of its workforce, leaving many to wonder if the much-hoped for 'rebalancing' of the economy had quite literally hit the buffers.

However, the resulting furore over that Thameslink deal has also forced the government to look again at how it awards such contracts, and has left the Department for Transport somewhat desperately scrabbling around to find contracts that could offer Bombardier's Derby plant a short-term lifeline. Hence yesterday's announcement, which involves a £80 million 'subsidy' from the Department.

Production of the carriages will start later this year. It's welcome news but sadly isn't as enough to support the (current) 3000 or so jobs at Bombardier and more in the rail cluster in and around Derby given that the current London Underground contract expires in 2014. That was why the Thameslink contract was seen by many as so strategically important in supporting the UK's last remaining train maker.

While there may be other small deals coming Bombardier's way (a £120m contract to build new carriages for the CrossCountry franchise may be one such deal) which could be vital in keeping things going in the short term, these deals are small compared to Thameslink, and many think that Bombardier still needs a big order to safeguard its UK operations and jobs - such as that for the forthcoming Crossrail contract.

The Crossrail tender (an order for 60 trains for the Heathrow to Canary Wharf Crossrail route) has been postponed from late 2013 to 2014 to both save costs and to give the government time to review public procurement policy and to include any recommendations form that review into the procurement process.

On the latter, an insightful report earlier this month by the House of Commons Transport Select Committee recommended that future train orders separate out financing from train design and manufacturing when awarding future carriage contracts. The select committee was informed by experts (notably a team coordinated by Manchester University - see below) that Siemens's better credit rating was a key factor in securing preferred bidder status for Thameslink as against Bombardier.

In addition, the Committee report also called for the National Audit Office to review how the Thameslink contract was awarded, and supported the government's wish to put a "sharper focus on UK strategic interest" in awarding future contracts, although to date ministers have failed to say how they will do this and stay inside EU single market rules.

The procurement system certainly needs to change if the same mistakes aren't made all over again on Crossrail. In the UK governments have tended to look at the short term direct costs of contracts and have taken a pretty narrow perspective on 'value for money'. But other countries in the EU seem to be able to take a broader view of what value for money involves and not just focus on the lowest price.

In this case a key factor is the wider jobs multiplier. Whilst more limited in the UK given the hollowing out of our manufacturing base and hence reliance on imports of key components from abroad, almost 20% of Derby's economic output, or £2.6 billion a year, is still derived from the train assembly business, according to a 2010 report by the city council. That report found that 5,010 people were directly employed in the industry in Derby alone, with 3,000 of those at Bombardier.

Easily the most detailed and complete analysis on the subject has come from researchers at the ESRC funded CRESC research centre at the University of Manchester. The authors (Julie Froud, Adam Leaver and Karel Williams at Manchester, John Law (Open University) and Sukhdev Johal (Royal Holloway, University of London), concluded that bundling train leasing with building and maintenance meant that Bombardier's lower credit rating put it at a key disadvantage against Siemens.

The authors also use different - and more complete - calculations to those used by civil servants to look at the economic value of train making at Bombardier, and in so doing include consideration of tax revenues from UK employment and reemployment prospects.

They assume that 1,000 jobs at Bombardier could have been saved by the award of Thameslink contracts to Derby, and argue that the UK government's tax receipts as a result would be nearly £20 million per annum by 2012, with a cumulative social gain of over £100 million. In addition, they highlight the re-employment prospects of Derby workers which are poor given the UK's past record of heavy dependence on publicly funded employment.

But the authors note that the indirect employment benefits from giving Derby the contract would have been limited because of the problem of broken supply chains in rail engineering: many of Bombardier's high value added sub-assemblies and components are already imported (typically from Germany), highlighting in turn the UK's past failure to support the wider supply chain.

The authors highlight the fact that in rail engineering, only 25% of British sectoral intermediate output is domestically sourced, compared with some 55% in Germany.
The UK train industry's capacity to sustain domestic employment is therefore profoundly different. While domestically sourced German intermediate output sustains 72,000 jobs in rail engineering, only 8,000 are sustained in the UK.

And echoing a point I have been making repeatedly about the value-destroying effects of takeovers, the authors criticise the churning of ownership which led to 5 changes of ownership in 12 years at the Derby factory and underinvestment in the plant. A new policy on takeovers is still needed.

And of particular relevance for public policy, the report questions the narrowly conceived "Which? Best Buy" approach of politicians and the civil service in the UK.

On all of these points the authors are bang on and the report ('Knowing what to do. How not to build trains') is well worth reading. A more complete decision making process encompassing the broader economic impact of purchasing decisions on our manufacturing base is essential. Simply hoping for 'rebalancing' isn't enough, particularly in relation to the train building industry. Rather a more intelligent industrial policy is needed, in which procurement policy should play a role.

Without that, the government may find that, down the line, the Bombardier train has switched tracks and gone abroad, taking with it what is left of the UK's train building supply chain.

Professor David Bailey works at Coventry University Business School.

4 Comments

Dean said:

There appears to be many anecdotal references in this post not backed up by any hard evidence.

Whilst you point to Siemens credit rating as the apparent major factor of the thameslink contract award, you have failed, albeit like every news agency that reports on this, to highlight the issues of build quality and reliability with Bombardier trains which in my opinion is far more pertinent.

As someone who travels on Bombardiers trains frequently and has a father-in-law who has just started driving them, I have to inform you of the reliability issues that are all too frequent with all Bombardier trains.

Firstly, the S stock delivery for the metropolitain line has been temporarily suspended due to reliability issues. The new 172s for london midland are also having major electrical problems since delivery. Similarly there were problems with the 170s delivered to london overground and the electrostar variants cannot work with each other despite being of the same class.

Bombardier air conditioning is also of sub-standard quality. There are only 3 settings yet the new siemens trains have state_of_the_art climate control that responds to the amount of people on the train, a common complaint on the thameslink route. Many people get to the point of passing out due to the heat in the coaches yet nothing changes in terms of design.

There needs to be balance in the reporting of Bombardier stories (canadian co based in germany) and surely being a brum based blog, you would have lamented the closure of the alstom plant that built the first batch of pendolinos?

Please get some balance and give the superior product a chance. Alstom and siemens products are streets ahead of bombardier and its about time that this jingoistic political hogwash stops. Why not read into bombardiers track record at other train factories?

David Bailey said:

Thanks for taking the time to comment, Dean. It would be interesting to see why the Siemens deal was preferred – indeed the Commons Select Ctte’s chair has called for greater clarity around how the decision was taken. Siemens is reported to be opposing this.
But bear in mind that the Thameslink deal will actually be financed by the Siemens-led consortium, which will place equity into a specially created business and then raise debt to build the trains at the Siemens factory near Düsseldorf.
In a PFI-style operation, those trains will then be leased to the train operating company on the Thameslink line, which will pay a regular fee to the consortium that will in turn repay the debt.
You’re living in cloud cuckoo land Dean if you don’t think Siemens credit rating was key here, as under such a PFI-dominated funding scheme, securing debt on good terms is absolutely critical.
That’s why genuinely independent commentators and analysts (academics, cross part MPs) have raised the issue of financing being separated from train design and manufacturing when the government makes decisions on train carriage contracts in the future.
Thanks for commenting anyway.

John Holt said:

Professor David Bailey’s article repeats 2 big falsehoods that are gaining credibility through being repeated and endorsed by people who should know better. These are then not being challenged by politicians, participants or industry insiders for reasons of political expediency, fear of causing offence or of facing dismissal. It is time to jump off the bandwagon and face reality.

Firstly it may be true that the Thameslink deal prompted Bombardier to announce 1400 job losses. It is, however, disingenuous, if politically convenient, to imply the loss of the deal caused the job losses. They were going to be announced anyway.

Secondly it is wrong that Siemens credit rating was a key factor in Bombardier losing the contract. Whilst insiders cannot speak openly and the actual bids are commercially confidential, the answers are available in the murky world of the internet. Bombardier apparently lost on both the engineering and the financial evaluations.

Commentary on the credit rating has been bedevilled by weak or politically driven reports building on the firm foundation of other weak reports.

Professor Bailey says: “The select committee was informed by experts (notably a team coordinated by Manchester University - see below) that Siemens's better credit rating was a key factor in securing preferred bidder status for Thameslink as against Bombardier.”
The select committee’s very unimpressive report (link in main article) says “It is hard to escape the conclusion that Siemens' A+ credit rating made a significant contribution to its success in winning the Thameslink procurement.” In fact the evidence they received and summarised at paras 25-28 does not support that conclusion (and excuse me if I discount the evidence from the local MPs!). It is worth having a look at how misreported facts have been given a gloss of credibility.

The committee reports: “Professor Karel Williams of the Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change suggested that the difference in the credit ratings of the two firms could have been worth "anything like £500 million"”(para 27). The oral minutes give the support:
Q11 Chair : Professor Williams, you cite Siemens’ higher credit rating as one of the reasons they got the contract. Is that something you can be firm about?
Professor Williams: I have not seen figures on which the DfT has made the decision, nor has anybody else had sight of them. All I have is an envelope and that tells me that Bombardier has a B++ credit rating and Siemens an A+ credit rating. You can then play around with rates of interest and various other things, and on the back of my envelope it looks like it could be anything like £500 million.

“No” would have been a simpler answer. So let’s look at Professor Williams report (link in main article). Readers can form their own view, but to me this is not an academic report but a political polemic. Indeed, a rant in places. On page 5 the source is given as “When the Daily Telegraph (7th July 2011) raised this issue with “investment bankers familiar with deals similar to Thameslink”, their estimate was that lower cost of finance gave Siemens a financing cost advantage of £700 million over 30 years”. This is it: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/transport/8621498/Bombardier-had-little-chance-on-Thameslink-because-of-contract-terms.html.

So a journalist asks a non-insider city contact a misconceived question and it is reported in a newspaper. It is then laundered to respectability by an “academic” report and quoted, less a margin for error to a politically driven committee. The article further reinforces this myth. It is politically convenient rubbish.

Siemens credit rating does not give a 3o year benefit. They are not a leasing company and will not fund it for 30 years. Once the rolling stock is delivered such that contractual delay risk is eliminated and once initial teething problems are eliminated, the funding would be syndicated. By that time debt markets should have stabilised.

Siemens’ credit rating does, however, matter in at least 4 other ways:
• Executability – Siemens can sign now and sort the finance later. Bombardier need financing commitments now.
• Bombardier need a bigger profit margin on the manufacturing because they have a higher cost of capital.
• Bombardier’s poor credit rating will be reflected in the higher purchase price of every component from every subcontractor. It would cost Bombardier more to build the same train as Siemens. They can try and manage that by building a lesser quality train.
• Warranty and product support over a 30 year life. (See Angel trains written evidence)

The criticisms of the way the contract was let (design, build, finance, maintain) are, to some extent attempts to escape the consequences of the above. The second and third are, however, inescapable. The first can be managed, to some extent, where the Train Operating Company will maintain (as with Southern) but it is unclear it is universally good practice.

The bundled contract was a Dft/Labour ploy to escape the clutches of the Rolling Stock leasing companies with whom they have battled and royally lost. However, bundling maintenance into the lease does ensure that the bidder has to price the future cost. Less well built trains, trains built to a price, or built by manufacturers with poor reliability record are likely to have a higher future maintenance cost and this is exposed to immediate scrutiny and not hidden away to be borne by the next franchisee.

Bombardier lost in a fair competition. Let us face reality. It is grim.

The reality is that no one in their right mind would have a train assembly plant in the UK. Why would you? Our trains are narrower and lower than those in the rest of Europe. Quite simply you can build and test trains for the UK market in Europe but you cannot assemble trains for the European market in the UK. Imagine it, every single coach made in the UK has to be lorried to Europe and arrangements made for testing, rectification and commissioning. I cannot even think of the last time that was done.
Train manufacturers are multinationals. They need to be. Why would any multinational locate an assembly plant in the UK? Assembly at Derby may well be doomed. Bombardier may wish to keep a design office in Derby but unless they show quality leadership they will not be able to attract and retain the staff. If the UK is an outpost of the empire why work there? Grim.

As was pointed out to the Select Committee, EU law prohibits favouring any bidder on the basis of their nationality. It also prohibits state aid except for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises. Such SMEs are not a major feature of a pan-European rolling stock manufacturer looking for certainty of component supply and long life aftersales support. Indeed Bombardier blamed component manufacturers insolvencies for the late delivery of trains in 2009.

So there really is little mileage in applying wishy washy socio-economic factors in evaluating bids to push work to the UK.
In any event, I do agree that without the wider industrial base, pushing contracts the way of Bombardier is merely pushing value to the non-UK subcontractors. You could have an inferior product, at a higher cost and create employment abroad. Great.

If, for the reasons above, a Bombardier assembly plant in the UK is not viable then the Hitachi promises of a plant in the North East to assemble new high speed trains looks somewhat hollow. That is a much bigger procurement scandal. We really are going to be buying an unsuitable train, that will cost too much, whilst creating employment abroad.

You have to distinguish between three sets of issues: (a) which trains are better, (b) why does making trains within the UK make economic, design and political sense, and (c) what does the UK need to do to make more train systems domestically. There is another issue (d) related to the scale of the UK market, but those arguments are irrelevant because of the billions of dollars that could be spent on mass transit in the UK and elsewhere.

It is argued that UK trains are different from those in Europe and that you could not have multiple UK production centers in Europe: "Our trains are narrower and lower than those in the rest of Europe. Quite simply you can build and test trains for the UK market in Europe but you cannot assemble trains for the European market in the UK. Imagine it, every single coach made in the UK has to be lorried to Europe and arrangements made for testing, rectification and commissioning."

The problem with this line of thought is that Japanese manufacturers can simply retool to make different kinds of trains and do so on a regular basis. The Japanese also have local factories in the US to capture local US markets, adjust to local US specifications and protectionist legislation or local technical staff, e.g. the LRV staff they had in their Boston office, their factories in Yonkers, NY and Lincoln, Nebraska.

The counter argument is that the UK market might be smaller than the US market. Which market? Clearly, the subway system and commuter rail markets add up to something and begin to reach scale. Also, if the UK were to develop a new generation transit system and gain first mover advantages, the scale and location issues would be irrelevant.

If the UK should hope to even capture first mover advantages in a new or old industry again, it will have to think about users and their needs. It will recognize that by linking designers, production and users in some proximity albest based initially in the UK, that it will have advantages by doing do. So local production might provide these advantages if other things are taken care of.

There was a great deal of consolidation in the European mass transit production industry so Mr. Holt is not off base in his comments. The problem is that the UK is so far behind in so many different industrial fields and now its post-industrial economy is failing. It needs manufacturing to generate capital to pay for hospitals, schools and a welfare state.

Let's take these arguments about manufacturing scale in the global era to their logical conclusion. Are we saying that the UK will never export in new areas that it does not presently export in? If so, the UK will be doomed to third rate status: http://londonprogressivejournal.com/article/view/988/how-can-we-save-the-british-economy-from-third-rate-status

An industrial policy should not reward technical inferiority. Also, the successes in mass transit manufacturing don't just come with industrial policy. They also combine a competent firm with the industrial policy and other factors: http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09238/09238%282010-2%29269-291.pdf So critics of naive industrial policy measures should understand the strawman arguments out there.

Let's assume Bombardier trains are inferior to those made by Siemens. This inferiority might have to do with inferior designs, inferior testing, inferior feedback from users and the lack of a systemic industrial policy regime (which included a state of the art mass transit industrial laboratory). Countries which simply try to get cheaper goods that benefit from other country's comparative advantages or industrial policies (e.g. South Korea, China, Japan, Germany or even Canada) will fall further behind. The UK could begin to capture part of the mass transit market at the components level if it had a sophisticated mass transit industrial policy system and matching competence in business and engineering schools and local laboratories, but it doesn't.

This is really what is at stake. So, really you want to know why policies have not build up the domestic production competence as exists in the UK. Why do some places have more competent producers than others? How can the UK create a foundation for gaining such competence? These are the most important questions.

The UK builds a lot of competitive military production equipment which granted is not simply limited by standards unique to the UK. But, the country will have to think whether having that comparative advantage is going to help it improve its mass transit system, its fight against global warming, its ability to fight a depression and a host of social ills.

The UK will have to do as well as Siemens does for Germany and better than Bombardier may do even for the UK. This requires a good design and good policies and political will. Be creative.

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